INTRODUCTION
Rule-based expert systems have moved from a research activity in a small number of academic computer science departments to a growing commercial activity. This transition clearly indicates that the structure of a complex computer program enforced by a rule-based system (namely, the clear separation of the decision-making process, the inference engine.
from the data on which the decisions are based, the rule basei is a useful step in the evolution of programming strategies At the same time there has been a growing recognition that in most decision-making situations the data (namely, the rule base and the initial evidence used to start the decision-making process) are not known with certainty and consequently the inference procedures used in traditional rule-based systems are inappropriate.
Over the last decade a number of inference procedures which use various numerical representations of uncertainty have been developed for use in rule-based systems.
However, for a variety of reasons (including the fact that there is little logical basis for the representations! none of then has been widely successful.
In this paper we will describe, the current state of an ongoing research project which is attempting to use probability as the mechanism for representing uncertainty in a rule-based system. . A previous report was given in Eddy and Pei (19861. We have been constrained in our development of a probability-based expert system by a number of external considerations, the most important of which we delineate here.
The single most important constraint is that we are doing our development in the context of an existing rule-based expert system and as such we are constrained to limit the modifications we might wish to make to the system. In particular, we wish to limit our modifications to the inference engine only. This is not an overly serious constraint and it enforces a certain /oca/zfy on the nature of the possible computations. Exactly this locality of computation will be required if the system is ever to be scaled up to a rule-base containing thousands or m llions of rules. Barnett 11981) has induced the same kind of locality of computation in a system very similar to ours but at the cost of assuming unrealistic independence in 'arious parts of the rule base: we discuss Bamett's work further in Section 5.
A second important constraint is that any numerical expressions of uncertainty about data are themselves quite uncaruin. in practice, and as such we wish to allow for the expression of uncertainty about the uncertainties. There are a number of possible ways to do this: we have chosen what appears to us the simplest way to address this constraint. Precisely, we are using belief functions (Shafer. 1976) to represent sets of probability distributions. We discuss some of the details irf belief functions in Section 4.
There are at least two patties involved in the development and use of a rule-based expert system: the expert, who expresses the rules, and the user, who causes the system to run by supplying it with some initial external evidence. An early planned use of the system we are developing was for game-playing to evaluate possible strategies. Initially we felt that it was important for the two players, the expert and the user, to be able to interchange roles without affecting the results. This turns out to be a quite complex constraint: a simplified version of this constraint requires that the system perfrom properly (i.e.. get the "right" answer) if the expert and the user are one and the same individual
The remainder of this paper is organixed as follows. In the next section we give a very brief introduction to the details of a rule-based expert system. In Section 3 we describe what, to us, are the most natural methods for incorporating uncertainty into a rule-based system. In Section 4 we provide a few of the formal details of belief functions and describe a few of their properties. In Section 5 we discuss various possible approximation techniques which will speed up the computations. In Sections 6 and 7 we provide detailed
properties of the approximations we have developed. The essence of the approximations is to force the belief function to have a simpler form; an extreme form of this simplification occurs when the belief function represents a unique probability distribution. In Section 8
we briefly describe some of the features of our implementation of this theory in a LISP computer program.
RULE-BASED EXPERT SYSTEMS
A rule-based expert system lor production system I consists of a collection of production rules together with a system for linking or "chaining" the rules to simulate a human expert's reasoning process. A production rule (or, simply, a rulel is a statement of the form "If A then B," where A and B are logical propositions.
The mechanism used for chaining rules is generally one of two kinds: either forward chaining or backward chaining. In the forward chaining scheme the user of the system supplies some evidence, generally of the form "A is true,' and the system then uses this evidence together with the rules to reason towards conclusions or goals. Forward chaining is generally described as causal or deductive reasoning. In the backward chaining scheme the system attempts to satisfy its goals by finding rules which, if true, would imply those goals. It repeats this process until it is compelled, by the lack of any rules implying its current goals, to ask the user if a particular one or more of those goals (the antecedents of certain rules) are true. If the user accedes this is deemed to be evidence that the rule is true. Backward chaining is generally referred to as diagnostic reasoning. One crucial computational problem in either form of reasoning is how to discover rules with given antecedents (forward chaining) or with given consequents (backward chaining) in the rule base. Currently the only general strategy is to search over the entire rule base. Some savings can be made by "remembering" the results of previous searches so they can be "looked up" in a table.
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PROBABILITIES AND RULES
There is currently no generally accepted method for incorporating uncertainty into a rulebased expert system. One method which seems appealing at first glance is to treat the user's probabilities on the evidence as a prior opinion and the expert's probabilities on the rules as a likelihood and simply use Bayes rule. In this method, we would expect the expert constructing the system to have joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to the propositions which are consequents of all the rules in the system. This joint probability distribution would be conditional on the assignment of truth values to those propositions in the system which are antecedents of some rale and not consequents of any rule Ithe evidence nodes). Also, we would expect the user of the system to have a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to these evidence nodes. There are a number of obvious difficulties with this scheme:
1. It is unreasonable to expect anyone to express a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to a large collection of propositions for two reasons:
a. The size of the collection of propositions:
b. The inherent uncertainty in the expressed probability distribution.
2. The amount of calculation required is overwhelming, being exponential in the number of propositions in the system.
3. The symmetry constraint mentioned in the introductory section is obviously not satisfied.
There are also a few subtler problems:
1. The pooling of expert and user opinion via Bayes rale would appear to be inappropriate. More precisely, use of Bayes rule to pool the probability distributions of two individuals has no logical basis unless one of the individuals declares the probability distribution of the other individual to be his own.
2. Both the expert and the user can reasonably be expected to have a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to ail the propositions in the system. The use of lower-dimensional marginal and conditional probability dLxtributions from these two higer-dimensional joint distributions appears to discard potentially useful information.
r^r rv -v,"»»/»■■
A second method for incorporating uncertainty into a rule-based expert system pools the opinions of the expert and the user. We would expect the expert constructing the system to have a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to all the propositions in the system and we would expect the user to also have such a joint probability distribution. This second method can. by the appropriate choice of a pooling rule, satisfy the symmetry constraint mentioned above.
If it is possible to decompose each joint probability distribution so that a piece of the decomposition can be attached to a small number of propositions, and if this piece can be combined with another piece so that the entire joint distribution can be recovered then the difficulty of assigning a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to a large collection of propositions may be overcome. One such decomposition is the conditional one: it would be desireable to have a decomposition that is symmetric so the order of composition is unimportant. Although Spiegelhalter (1986) has proposed a mechanism for allowing the conditional decomposition to be symmetric.
We also allow the expression of uncertainty about probabilities by use of a belief functions as a lower bound on the probability. This will allow us to alleviate the first of the three obvious difficulties mentioned above. It does not seem possible to significantly reduce the computational requirements mentioned in the third difficulty, however, in Sections 5. 6, and 7 we discuss an approximation which provides some reduction in the computational burden (see Eddy and Pei. 1986 , for an alternative scheme!.
4, BELIEF FUNCTIONS
Following Shafer (1976), let 9 be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. More generally, it can be shown that if a set of probability intervals are pven for the elements of a partition as 0 i L, i p, i Uj S 1. i=l n then for there to exist a corresponding belief function Bell I, it is necessary that both X"«! L, + U, -L, S 1. for all j and Z"-! U, + L r U. i 1. for all j.
This provides a quick and dirty test whether or not an expressed set of probability intervals are in fact representable by a belief function. Unfortunately, the sufficient conditions are considerably more complex.
One particularly nice feature of the theory of belief functions is that it distinguishes between indifference and ignorance. Complete ignorance is represented by the uacuous belief function that assigns basic probability one to the set 9 and zero to every subset.
Complete indifference assigns an equal amount to all singleton propositions and zero to every other subset; this is precisely a uniform probability distribution on the elements of the partition. Any degree of ignorance can be expressed quite naturally between the two extremes of complete ignorance and a well-defined probability distribution.
The basic theory of belief functions requires that the frame of discernment be composed of mutually exclusive propositions. This means that only one proposition at a time can be true.
In an expert system this condition is explicitly not satisfied: consequently, direct application of the the theory is impossible. We overcome this problem as follows. Let Q be a set of mutually supporting propositions: that is. suppose that 0 = IP,-P ! P "i^^a&^^A^^^^^^a^^^^^^^^^y^^^ rfjnir»y'^ur^jr*r''r*VTV^vvv*!r»VTV^^^ frame is compatible with another if it can be obtained from it by splitting some of its possibilities into finer possibilitiej. The frame of the finer analysis is called a refinement of ( the original: the former is called a coarsening of the latter. Before application of a rule of combination it may be necessary to refine one or both of the frames in order to obtain a ,> common frame of discernment.
REDUCING THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Taere are considerable computational difficulties in using this theory. An initial assignment of 2" basic probability assignments must be made, where n represents the number of propositions in the frame of discernment 9 The required number of evaluations in using any combination rule increases exponentially as more propositions are included. It seems reesonable that intelligent exploitation of some structure could result in computational savings One way to reduce computational complexity is to assume that each piece of evidence either confirms or denies a single proposition rather than a disjunction. This is the approach that Bamett takes in his work (Bamett, 19811. While this will reduce the number Ot calculations from exponential M linear, it also means that the frame must be broken into independent partitions. This is a very strong assumption and not likely to be satisfied in practice. Here, we are interested in retaining the more natural possibility of dependence among the propositions in the system.
Another possible approach would discount, at an early stage of the calculations, set«-with zero, or very small, basic probability assignments. Yet another approach is to ignore those sets with a cardinality higher than a predetermined threshold. This is the approach we take here. It is possible to reduce the computational problem from one of exponential time to one of polynomial time, and the degree of the polynomial can be set in advance by suitable choice of the threshold.
A belief function provides both a lower bound and an upper bound for the probability.
The narrower the range of this interval the more definite the knowledge about the probability It eieems reasonable to require that any approximation to an /»hfunction should preserve the properties of an ni-function. This produces one of the following three possibilities:
1. a less definite assignment of uncertainty la wider intervall;
2. a more definite assignment of uncertainty la narrower interval).
3. no change.
Suppose the cardinality of 9 is n (that is © contains n propositions!. The approximations to be used involve neglecting ^i-function values attached to elements of 2 with cardinality greater than a threshold value k. To restore the approximation to an ^»-function requires some form of renormalization.
To produce the first case (abovel it is proposed that the ^(-function is restored by moving all the ignored basic probability mass to the element 9
To produce the second effect the excess basic probability mass should be added to the elements of 2^ with cardinality less than lor equal to) the threshold value k in proportion to their original values.
AN OUTER APPROXIMATION
Denoting the approximations by ml), Bel I ) and PI ( ) and dealing with the conservative approach first, the desired results are as follows:
Bel'(A) ^ Bell A) . A contained in 9
Pl'lA) 2 PKA) . A contained in 9. Tne value k=0 always yields tho vacuous probability assignment and the value k=n-l always yields the original probability assignment. It is clear that the smaller the value of k the more information is being neglected and the approximation becomes more vague (the interval widensl. The higher the value of k the less information is being neglected so the approximation should be closer to the original specification. Clearly there is also a possibility that the new m -function will not be different than the original /Jj-function. This It has now been shown that this form of approximation gives the desired effect of widening the interval between the belief and the plausability The computational saving; is made because of all the icros used to replace the original assessments for sets with cardinality greater than k. Clearly these sets can now be ignored when performing a combination. Tius form of approximation could prove very useful in large systems: however, there is « danger that the approximation may not be very guod. The best results will undoubtedly come when small basic probability numbers are assigned to sets with high cardinality. It may prove to be a worthwhile exercise to increment the value of k on successive iterations until two successive iterations yield close results. This sort of numerical exercise is a task for the future.
AN INNER APPROXIMATION
In a similar manner to Section 6 the opposite effect of narrowing the interval between the belief and the plausability can be achieved. Denoting these approximations by nur I. We define rri, to be an order k inner approximation to m as follows:
Once again the first requirement of an nhfunction is trivially satisfied. As all the component parts of Equation 7.3 are non-negative it is sufficient to verify the third clause of an m-function. That is, we must verify that the component parts of m»h sum to one.
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The conditions for an m-function are thus satisfied. The range of possible values for k is 1 i k i n-1.
The value k=l corresponds to approximating the belief function by a probability distribution and the value k = n-l yields the original probability assignment.
It is now necessary to prove the assertions made in Equation 7 But since the cardinality of A is assumed to be less than or equal to k. then the cardinality of E is already determined, such that The terms increased' and decreased' in Table 7 -1 should not be interpreted strictly: that is. they include the possibility of no change.
Both of these approximations set basically the same elements to zero, for a given value of k. to achieve a computational saving Ithe one exception is 9.) It may be possible to combine the two approaches. As one approximation achieves a wider interval and the other achieves the opposite effect it should be possible to find some optimal combination of the We note that one of the primary motivations for the use of belief functions is the uncertainty attached to the probability assessments of the expert and the user An order 1 inner approximation to a belief function is a probability distribution. An interesting question occurs. Is there any sense in which the order 1 inner approximation is an optimal approximation lestimate?) of the uncertain probability distribution which is represented )y the belief function?
. Each rule base requires that an expert supply belief functions for each of the rules. These expert-supplied beliefs attached to the rules, in most cases, will not change from one use of the system to the next.
The system allows both forward and backward chaining In a typical chaining program without belief functions, when a user supplies the factlsl for a rule, the rule will fire and a conclusion will be reached with certainty
In this system, the user supplies evidence in the form of a belief function. The expert-supplied belief function for that rule is retrieved. All of the precondition clauses of the rule must be checked because they. too. may have attached belief functions. This is because previous rule instantiations may have created a belief function for these if clauses. Also, an if clause may have a belief function attached to it from a previous use as an evidence node.
From a computer programming standpoint this means that many belief functions must be created and stored and additional checking must be performed to determine if these belief functions are to be used with the current rule. This is mainly determined by looking at the active-set for each belief function. The active-set is a list of the propositions that a belief function pertains to. When compared, rules may have some of the same members of the active-set list, but no •"•«'o rules shoald have exactly the same members. The procedure that takes two belief functions and defines them on a compatible frame of discernment is called refinement.
After all of the belief functions associated with a mle firing have been combined into one overall belief function, control is returned to the chaining program. The resulting belief function is stored for further use and is output to the user along with the conclusion (result of the instantiated rulel. The user can then begin this process again by introducing more new evidence.
